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Abstract:  The Upper Midwest is poised for a major investment boom in wind-powered electricity 
generation. Public policy currently favors corporate ownership structures for new investment in this  
field, but when wind development takes place under the aegis of an external corporate ownership 
group the local economic participation will generally be limited to a minor role. This study attempts to 
quantify the regional value-added and employment consequences of local- versus outside-ownership of  
wind-powered electricity generation.  We employ a realistic pro forma model of a “flip” structure  --  
i.e. a local equity “community wind” group partnered with an external tax-motivated equity group --  
for a modestly sized (9.9 MW) wind farm, using recent vendor-certified capital costs combined with 
additional financial estimates from industry participants, assuming a class four wind resource. The 
present value of the residuals (after tax profits) as well as the other O&M expenditures are annuitized 
and entered into a Minnesota state-level input-output model. We find that, respectively, under 
pessimistic and optimistic parameter assumptions in the community-wind group’s pro forma, the 
impact on state-level value added is 3.1 and 4.5 times larger than the impact would be under an 
external ownership structure. The impact on employment is respectively 2.5 and 3.5 times larger than 
that generated by an external ownership structure.
* The author thanks John Ihle, Dan Juhl, and Lowell Rasmussen for generously sharing data and experience. Research 
assistance was provided by Dugan Flanders and Thompson Clifford.
Ownership and Regional Economic Impact: The Case of Wind Development in Minnesota
I. Introduction
With RES legislation growing in popularity across the U.S., current economics favor an 
immense build-out of wind over the course of the next decade.1 A great deal of analysis has focused on 
the location of best wind resources, and upon the technology and infrastructure (transmission capacity, 
balancing generation, and possible storage media) that will be necessary to incorporate significant 
quantities of wind power into the generation mix.2 
In practice, public policy has been an influential if not decisive factor in shaping both the 
volume of wind development  and also the specific business organizational form that this development 
assumes.3 Current policy, for example, favors firms with sufficiently large tax liabilities and with an 
established capital market presence. Smaller pools of local capital, organized as partnerships, 
cooperatives, municipals, non-profits, or LLCs, have a more difficult time taking advantage of the full 
range of existing public policy incentives. A  recent survey found that only 4% of U.S. wind capacity is 
locally owned, in stark contrast, for example, to the northern European figures of 83% and 45% in 
Denmark and Germany, respectively.4
 When wind development takes place under the aegis of an external corporate ownership group, 
the local economic participation will generally be limited to a minor role in construction (e.g. cement 
contracting), enhanced property tax collections, and a continuing stream of land-lease payments (often 
in the range of $3K - $4K per year). Compared to corporate projects, some research has suggested that 
locally-owned “community wind” projects will likely spend more locally on attorney fees, electrician 
services, and other construction-related outlays.5 The largest effect, however, may be the residuals of 
the project, which would enter the local economy directly as income streams.6 
1 Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted Renewable Electricity Standards, while five more have 
adopted voluntary targets. (http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm, last accessed June 
21, 2010). See the [California] Renewable Electricity Transmission Initiative (2008) for a relative ranking of levelized 
renewable generation costs. NREL researchers recently estimated that in order to reach a national goal of 20% of 
electricity production from wind power by the year 2030, annual installations of new capacity will have to grow by 2018 
to over 16 gigawatts per year, which was roughly the entire installed capacity in the U.S., as of 2008 (Laxon, Hand, & 
Blair, 2008).
2 One comprehensive example is the U.S. Department of Energy report 20% Windpower by 2030 (U.S. D.O.E., 2008).
3 Kildegaard (2007). Bolinger and Wiser (2004).
4 Windustry: http://www.windustry.com/communitywind (last accessed June 21, 2010). In Minnesota, the figure is 25%.
5 Grover (2005), Northwest Economic Associate (2003).
6 Lantz and Tegen (2008), Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006).
Much of the best on-shore wind resource in the U.S. is located in the central Great Plains.7 It is 
an open question as to whether or not the local communities there will embrace and promote the 
anticipated wind development, or whether local resistance will prove too strong -- as for example it has 
with respect to on-shore wind development in England. In the latter case, extensive research has 
established that successful local resistance is strongly related to an unacceptable balance between local 
costs and local benefits, despite a national policy that strongly promotes wind development.8 In the 
socially conservative region of the U.S. Great Plains, it seems likely that political support for wind 
development traces more to the economic potential that it represents than to environmental sensibilities 
per se. A public policy that aims to encourage wind development in general might yet prove to be 
undermined by tax incentives and other policy provisions that strongly discourage local ownership.
Since ownership structure is an outcome significantly influenced by public policy, and 
potentially a determinant of community acceptance in this region poised for rapid wind development, 
this study investigates the consequences of ownership structure for local economies. Specifically, we 
conduct our analysis of Minnesota, where community wind is an established force in state policy and 
the policy developments relating to grid connection and tariffs are reasonably far along.
A few fairly modest attempts have been made to analyze the differential economic development 
consequences of locally-owned wind development.9 This article pursues this question with some 
important enhancements: i) the cost data are actual and up-to-date, vendor-certified costs as of late 
2009; ii) the power prices are consistent with power purchase agreements recently approved by the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission;  iii) a fully-articulated financing model is included, complete 
with a tax equity partner and with supplementary bank financing; iv) the local ownership residuals (as 
well as the various O&M expenses) are inserted into a state-level input-output model to capture the 
effects of the project on the regional economy.
II. Ownership Structures
Capturing the federal tax incentives is a key element of project design, comprising as these do 
somewhere in the range of 30-40% of a project’s overall revenue stream.10 Bolinger et al. (2004) and 
7 U.S. Department of Energy windmaps: http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last accessed June 21, 
2010).
8 Toke (2005); Devine-Wright (2005); Rogers et al. (2008); Hain et al. (2006)
9  Galluzzo (2005), Grover (2005), Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006), Lantz and Tegen (2008),
10 The production tax credit (PTC) currently stands at $21/MWH, while the double declining depreciation allowance 
allows full write-down of the project’s capital costs in just five years.
Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006) describe various ownership structures for local capital to 
participate in wind development, the most successful of which in fact capture the majority of the 
federal incentives. Harper et al. (2007) survey and evaluate a variety of financing structures for larger 
projects, again with the capture of federal incentives being a principal objective. 
One common structure involves a tax equity partner with sufficient tax appetite to consume the 
entire federal incentive. Frequently an ownership “flip” is arranged at a pre-determined moment, for 
example upon the expiration of the production tax credit (after 10 years), or after the tax equity partner 
has achieved a pre-negotiated after-tax internal rate of return on its original investment. After the flip 
takes place, majority ownership rights to the remaining cash flow devolve back to the local equity 
group.
In the analysis that follows we formally model an ownership structure in which an equity 
partner  captures most (99%) of the tax incentives (depreciation, production tax credits, interest 
deductions) over the first 10 years of the project. For years 11-20 the ownership shares flip to 5% for 
the tax equity investor and 95% for the local investor.11 The project’s total debt financing is calibrated 
to enable the tax-motivated equity partner to achieve a targeted after-tax internal rate of return (IRR) on 
its 99% equity stake. The term on the debt is chosen to maintain debt service coverage requirements at 
acceptable levels. Since the flow of benefits to the local equity group is extremely uneven (see below) 
over the project’s 20-year lifespan, we calculate and annuitize the net present value of these benefits.12 
The local ownership residuals of the project are subsequently entered into a state-wide input-output 
model, wherein the ultimate economic impacts are estimated and compared with projects employing 
exclusively non-local equity
III. Pro Forma Modeling
A 20-year pro forma model was created for a 9.9 MW project (6 x 1.65), incorporating the 
actual capital, development, and O&M costs from a current project at the University of Minnesota. 
These costs are presented in Tables 1-2. 
We construct two scenarios (optimistic and pessimistic), with parameters reported in Table 3. 
The key differences include, respectively: 1) interest rates on bank debt; 2) requisite after-tax internal 
11 5% is the minimum IRS requirement for the tax partner’s continued participation. See Harper et al. (2007), esp. pp.69-
70.
12 For example: if the after-tax net present value comes to $5 million, at a discount rate of 5%, this is equivalent to an 20-
year annuity stream of $401,212.94  annually. In this case, we would use the annuity payment as a key input to the state-
level input-output model.
rates of return; 3) discount rates applied to the ultimate net cash flows. These differences in free 
parameters lead to some key differences in endogenous variables, including: 1) levels of overall debt 
financing in the project; 2) capital contributions on the part of the tax equity partner; 3) debt 
maturities.13 A screen-shot of the pro forma cash flow sheet (years 1-7) is presented as Table 4.
Figure 1 shows the annual after-tax, net profit share of the project accruing to the local 
ownership group. As with most flips, the local equity partner returns are much larger late than early.14 
Both scenarios share a common trajectory. Year 11 the local investor is assigned 95% of the project’s 
operating cash (and attendant profit taxes), but the remaining years of debt service (two and five years, 
in optimistic and pessimistic respectively) ensure that the corresponding net cash distribution is much 
lower.  After the debt is retired (year 12 or 15), the project’s net cash equals its operating cash. With the 
ownership shares now flipped, distributions to the local investor rise much higher for the duration of 
the project.
Figure 2 focuses on the first decade, where it can be seen that the returns to the local investor 
are essentially identical across scenarios.15 Since the numbers are in current, non-discounted dollars, 
one might visualize the benefits net of the opportunity cost of capital, by annuitizing (over 20 years) the 
initial local equity investment. For example, in the optimistic scenario, approximately $144,000 is 
initially invested; at a discount rate of 5% this equates to 20 annual payments of roughly $11,500. 
Figure 2 also graphs the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios after subtracting the opportunity cost of 
capital (O.C.C.). Over the first decade of the horizon, this correction appears to make a rather 
significant difference; however, as Figure 1 illustrates, in the 11th year the returns turn highly positive. 
After year 12 (optimistic) or 15 (pessimistic), the $11,500 correction is nearly two orders of magnitude 
below the benefit stream.
Figure 3 illustrates the uncorrected difference between net benefits in the two scenarios. The 
returns are essentially identical outside of years 11-15. For years 11-12, the optimistic scenario is 
impacted by assumption of 95% equity share (raising the tax liability), as well as full responsibility for 
the two remaining years of debt service. The 11th year shock to the pessimistic scenario is mitigated by 
13 Debt maturities are set to ensure that the debt service coverage ratios never fall below 140%, and that the total local 
return never falls negative in any given year.
14 In practice, there are various methods employed to advance the return to the local investors. These may include for 
example an expense item through which the tax-motivated partner pays a “management fee” to the local partners. 
Alternatively, an upfront development fee may be paid to the local investors. Each of these strategies has specific legal 
and tax consequences, incorporation of which would add more heat than light to the analysis here. Presumably, financial 
instruments may be employed to shift the timing of cash flows in a straightforward manner.
15 A significant portion of the early returns take the form of tax benefits, resulting from the favorable depreciation 
allowance (“double declining balances method”). We assume that the local investors have sufficient tax appetite to make 
full use of the depreciation and production tax credits accruing to their 1% of the project.
the extended term of the loan, which lowers debt service on an annual basis. In year 13, the optimistic 
scenario is free and clear of debt obligations, and the net returns rise accordingly.
An alternative  measure of the return on local equity is simply to calculate the internal rate of 
return (IRR) on a rolling basis. Figure 4 illustrates the paths for each scenario, plotting the IRRs for 
years 2-20. The IRRs reach zero (indicating full recuperation of the initial outlay) after 5 and 5.5 years, 
for pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, respectively. The IRRs reach the respective discount rates (6% 
and 5% respectively) between years 7 and 8 -- indicating a break-even after-tax net present value of 
zero. The IRRs grow sharply after year 10 (the flip year), and again after year 12 (optimistic) or 15 
(pessimistic), at which point the debt is fully retired. At the project’s conclusion, IRRs have reached 
32% (pessimistic) and 37% (optimistic).
In present value terms, discounting future after-tax net proceeds from the project, the two 
scenario yields are presented in Figure 5.16 Under the pessimistic scenario, the after-tax present value of 
the project comes to $3.876m.; the optimistic scenario comes to $7.027m. For a better sense of the 
average annual revenue, Figure 6 annuitizes the totals from Figure 5 for a 20-year lifespan of the 
project, at the previously-given after-tax rates of returns. The pessimistic scenario produces the 
equivalent of a 20-year annuity payment of $338k, while the optimistic scenario produces a 20-year 
annuity payment of $563k.
In addition to the two scenarios described above, we also model a third (“non-local”), 
corresponding to the impacts of wind development under external corporate ownership. For the non-
local scenario we assume identical O&M streams, however the pre-multiplier income stimulus is 
limited to the after-tax land-lease payments, since the project’s residuals accrue externally to the region.
The next section considers the state-wide economic impact, when these direct value-added 
effects are added to O&M spending streams, and subsequently allowed to operate through realistic 
local spending multipliers.
IV. Input-Output Analysis
In this section we use the outputs of the pro forma analysis as inputs to an economic impact 
analysis.  Specifically, we plug the data from the pro forma analysis into a state-level (Minnesota) 
16 Since the annuity has a present value exactly equal to the local equity stake, subtracting the annuity payment from the 
gross, and then discounting the cash flow is identical to simply calculating the discounted present value of the gross cash 
flow, net of the initial equity investment.
input-output analysis,17 using data and software from the Minnesota IMPLAN Group.18
There are two distinct categories of impacts, having to do in the first instance with capital 
expenditures and construction, and in the second with on-going operational expenditures and local re-
circulation of profits from the project. Our analysis is exclusively concerned with the latter, which are 
the lasting effects. 
Since both the net revenue stream accruing to local ownership and the expenditure stream 
associated with on-going O&M are variable, the local economic impact will differ from year to year. In 
principle these streams could be smoothed over the 20-year project life-span, either through contractual 
terms between the partners or through financial arrangements entirely separate from the partnership. 
The specific timing of impacts is of less interest here than the average magnitude of these impacts, so 
we proceed by effectively annuitizing both the expenditure and the net revenue streams, and using 
these as a point of departure for the input-output model. Figure 7 presents the annuitized values of the 
O&M expenditure streams under each scenario,19 including the breakdown according to expenditure 
category. These expenditure categories are subsequently mapped to the industry/commodity categories 
of the IMPLAN database, as reported in Table 5.
Table 6 reports results from simulating the impact of each scenario on the two most obvious 
indicators: value added, and employment. Figures 8 and 9 present the findings graphically.20 In terms of 
value added (including wages, profits, rents and taxes), the optimistic and pessimistic local ownership 
scenarios add an annual flow of $1.533m. and $1.05m., respectively, as compared with the outside 
ownership contribution of $344k. In terms of employment, the optimistic and pessimistic local 
ownership scenarios contributed an annual equivalent of 12.4 and 8.8 jobs, as compared with the 
17 Miller and Blair (2009) is comprehensive reference for input-output modeling, including full development of social 
accounting matrices.
18 IMPLAN Professional® Version 2.0. Our model uses the full social account matrix (SAM) specification, including all 
household institutions of final demand, along with state and local government (both education and non-education 
spending). The regional purchase coefficients are estimated econometrically by IMPLAN, and we have specified that the 
model choose “average” (as opposed to “max” or “first”) values for the RPCs. All direct increments to household 
spending are assigned to the SAM institution “Households $100-$150k.” As per Table 5, land leases are discounted by 
the tax rates from Table 3, before incrementing final demand. Project residuals, however, are already calculated after-tax, 
hence may be added without tax discounting to final demand.
19 Note that the only difference between the scenarios with respect to O&M expenses is the discount rate applied to future 
cash flows. The pessimistic scenario models a higher discount rate, which on the expense side actually lowers the 
present value of future payments.
20 The IMPLAN model calculates three layers of effects: direct, indirect, and induced.  The expenditure stimulus impacts 
the local economy directly through the purchase of local goods and services, and indirectly through the increased 
demand for intermediate inputs (necessary to meet this change in final demand). The re-spending of the income 
generated via direct and indirect effects induces another set of impacts, until the stimulus leaks out of the local economy 
via imports, taxes, and savings. For a detailed description see IMPLAN (2004).
outside ownership contribution of 3.5. 
V. Conclusion:
This study attempts to quantify the regional value added and employment consequences of 
local- versus outside-ownership of wind-powered electricity generation. We have employed a standard 
“flip” model for developing a modestly sized wind park in collaboration with a tax-motivated partner. 
In collaboration with industry participants we have modeled optimistic and pessimistic assumptions 
about financing terms, in an attempt to realistically bracket the range of possible outcomes. The net 
present value of the residuals (accruing to the local ownership group) of this model, along with the on-
going O&M expenditures, were subsequently inserted into an input-output model for the State of 
Minnesota, in order to quantify the direct and indirect consequences of higher local incomes and 
spending.
The analysis concludes that local ownership yields regional value added between 3.1 times 
(pessimistic) and 4.5 times (optimistic) higher than a project developed by non-local ownership. The 
employment impacts are, respectively, 2.5 and 3.5 times greater in the two local-ownership scenarios, 
relative to the non-local ownership baseline.
One over-arching cautionary note must be sounded: the “flip” model of local ownership 
depends fundamentally on the existence of tax appetite on the part of the tax-equity partner, which in 
turn depends directly on corporate profits. The pool of available tax-equity financing, moving forward, 
will depend critically on the strength of the recovery from the 2008-2009 recession.
These findings are not in and of themselves a rationale for “protectionism”. The key point is 
that -- as many have pointed out in the literature on wind development -- publicly provided incentives 
are in most cases not only influential but actually decisive factors in determining the quantity and 
nature (including ownership structure) of wind power development. Regional policy-makers have 
direct influence over the tariffs for different categories of wind development as well as the non-
financial terms of access to the grid. In the interest of regional development (as well as clean energy) 
they may wish to consider how to use those instruments to counterbalance a federal policy strongly 
biased against local ownership.
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Tables
Table 1: Upfront costs
Table 2: Operating expenses
Capital Per Turbine 9.9 MW Project
-x- -x-
-x- -x-
-x- -x-
Total Capital Costs $2,739,000 $16,436,000
Construction
Gen. conditions mob/demob. $37,000 $222,000
Foundation, conduit & transfer pad $153,000 $918,000
Crane, rigging, erection labor, turbine electrical labor $250,000 $1,500,000
Electrical wiring from generator to transformer $167,000 $1,002,000
FAA obstruction light $3,000 $18,000
Earthwork $15,000 $90,000
Access road and exterior improvements $60,000 $360,000
Total Construction Costs $685,000 $4,110,000
Utility Construction Costs
Transformer $20,000 $120,000
Substation/interconnection $17,500 $105,000
Total Utility Construction Costs $37,500 $225,000
Misc. Development Costs
Engineering/Project Planning $140,000 $840,000
$5,000 $30,000
Permitting $8,000 $48,000
Independent Testing & Inspection $7,500 $45,000
Interconnection studies $100,000 $600,000
Legal & Finance $25,000 $150,000
Total Misc. Development Costs $285,500 $1,713,000
Total Investment TOTAL $3,747,000 $22,484,000
Turbines and towers (a)
Land Transport (a)
Capitalized warranty (a)
Geotechnical Exploration
(a) Itemized costs redacted to comply with vendor’s contractual non-disclosure agreement.
Operating Expenses Per Turbine Total Years
     Land Leases $3,500 $21,000 1-20
$25,000 $150,000 6-20
$3,000 $18,000 1-20
$11,000 $66,000 6-20
$1,250 $7,500 1-20
$833 $5,000 1-20
     Property Tax $6,426 $38,557 1-20
$15,010 $90,057 1-5
$51,010 $306,057 6-20
     Service Agreement Renewal*
     Liability & Force Majeure Insurance*
     Equipment and Loss of Profit Insurance*
     Power Use*
     Accounting/Auditing*
     Total Expenses, Pre-inflation (Years 1-5)
     Total Expenses, Pre-inflation (years 6-20)
          * 3% annual inflation rate modeled
Table 3: Scenario assumptions
Scenario
Parameter: Optimistic Pessimistic
     interest rate on bank debt 8% 10%
loan term (years) 12 15
     after-tax IRR (tax investor) 8.5% 10%
     discount rate 5% 6%
debt financing 36% 38%
equity financing 64% 62%
tax partner equity $14.24m. (99%) $13.89m. (99%)
local investor equity $144k. (1%) $140k. (1%)
Parameter values constant across scenarios:
project lifespan 20 years
tax equity partner marginal  
tax rate(a)
40%
local investor marginal tax 
rate(a)
35%
production tax credit (PTC) .021/kwh
depreciation method double declining balances (5 years)
ownership “flip” after year 10
pre- and post-flip shares:
tax equity partner
local investor
.99/.05
.01/.95
power purchase agreement(b) .068/kwh
turbine efficiency(c) 39%
turbine availability(c) 95%
electricity sales $2,184,924
(a) Includes state and federal taxes.
(b) Based on power purchase agreements recently approved by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission. 
(c) Based on an average of four years of performance data for the Vestas V82 turbine installed on the campus of the 
University of Minnesota West Central Research and Outreach Center in Morris, Minnesota. This installation 
represents a class 4 wind resource, with average windspeeds at 50 meters  between 7.0 and 7.5 meters per second. 
Much of the Great Plains, including western Minnesota, the Dakotas, Nebraska, and parts of Iowa, are categorized 
as class 4 or higher wind zones (U.S.D.O.E, 1986).
Table 4: Pro Forma screenshot (first seven years; optimistic scenario)
YEAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Revenues  
32,131,242 32,131,242 32,131,242 32,131,242 32,131,242 32,131,242 32,131,242
PPA Rate $0.06800 $0.06800 $0.06800 $0.06800 $0.06800 $0.06800 $0.06800 
Total  Re ve n u e s $2,184,924 $2,184,924 $2,184,924 $2,184,924 $2,184,924 $2,184,924 $2,184,924 
Expenses
Total  Expe n s e s $90,057 $90,972 $91,915 $92,886 $93,886 $94,915 $335,867
O pe ratin g C as h  $2,094,867 $2,093,952 $2,093,010 $2,092,039 $2,091,039 $2,090,009 $1,849,057
De bt S e rvi ce ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075)
Coverage Ratio -1.95 -1.95 -1.95 -1.95 -1.95 -1.95 -1.72
Net Cash $1,020,792 $1,019,877 $1,018,935 $1,017,964 $1,016,964 $1,015,934 $774,982
interest $647,545 $613,423 $576,570 $536,770 $493,786 $447,363 $397,226
outstanding debt 8094312.72 $7,667,783 $7,207,130 $6,709,626 $6,172,321 $5,592,032 $4,965,319 $4,288,470
Taxable Income
Operating Cash 2094866.966 2093951.966 2093009.516 2092038.792 2091038.947 2090009.106 1849057.259
Interest -647545.018 -613422.622 -576570.435 -536770.072 -493785.681 -447362.538 -397225.544
Depreciation -8993680.8 -5396208.48 -3237725.088 -2428293.816 -2428293.816
TI -7546358.852 -3915679.136 -1721286.007 -873025.096 -831040.55 1642646.568 1451831.715
Investor Return
99% Investor -7470895.263 -3876522.345 -1704073.147 -864294.845 -822730.145 1626220.102 1437313.398
  Tax Rate 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40%
  Tax Savings $2,988,358 $1,550,609 $681,629 $345,718 $329,092 ($650,488) ($574,925)
  Tax Credits $668,009 $674,689 $681,435 $688,250 $695,132 $702,084 $709,105 
$3,656,367 $2,225,298 $1,363,065 $1,033,968 $1,024,224 $51,596 $134,179 
99% net cash $1,010,584 $1,009,678 $1,008,745 $1,007,784 $1,006,794 $1,005,775 $767,232 
 $(14,245,990) $4,666,951 $3,234,976 $2,371,810 $2,041,752 $2,031,019 $1,057,370 $901,412
Local return
1% Investor $75,464 $39,157 $17,213 $8,730 $8,310 ($16,426) ($14,518)
  Tax Rate 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
  Tax Savings $26,412 $13,705 $6,025 $3,056 $2,909 ($5,749) ($5,081)
  Tax Credits $6,748 $6,815 $6,883 $6,952 $7,022 $7,092 $7,163
Tot. Tax Savings $33,160 $20,520 $12,908 $10,008 $9,930 $1,342 $2,081
1% Net Cash $10,208 $10,199 $10,189 $10,180 $10,170 $10,159 $7,750
Total local Rt.  $(143,899) $43,368 $30,719 $23,097 $20,187 $20,100 $11,502 $9,831
kwh/yr
Tot.taxSavings
Total Eq.Rtn
Table 5: O&M expenditures mapped to IMPLAN commodities/institutions
Pro Forma Expense IMPLAN Commodity (Institution)
Land Leases Households $100-$150K (a)  [disposable income]
Service Agreement Renewal 365 --- Commercial and Industrial Machinery Maintenance & 
Repair
Liability and Force Majeure 
Insurance
357 -- Insurance Carriers
Equipment and Loss of Profit 
Insurance
357 -- Insurance Carriers
Power Use 31 -- Electric Power
Accounting/Auditing 368 -- Accounting/Tax Preparation/Bookkeeping
Property Tax 12001 -- State & Local Government Non-Education (50%)
12002 -- State & Local Government Education (50%)
Net Return to Local Investors Households $100-$150K (b) [disposable income]
(a)  Land leases are discounted by the assumed tax rate (see Table 3) before being added as an increment to final demand.
(b) Net returns to local investors are already calculated after tax, and therefore need not be discounted before incrementing 
final demand.
Table 6: Comparative Economic Impacts
Variable: Scenario:
Project’s Direct Contribution Input-Output Model “Multiplier” Effects (Scenario) 
/ (Non-
Local 
Scenario) 
Ratio
Annuitized 
Disposable 
Income
Project  
Property  
Tax 
Payments
Land Lease 
Income
(After-Tax)
Direct Indirect Induced Total
In-State 
Value Added
PESSIMISTIC $338,000 $38,557 $13,650 $249,517 $101,300 $309,865 $1,050,889 3.1
... OPTIMISTIC $563,000 $38,557 $13,650 $348,737 $138,288 $431,328 $1,533,560 4.5
... NON-LOCAL $0 $38,557 $13,650 $106,092 $49,892 $135,866 $344,057 1.0
In-State 
Employment
PESSIMISTIC  -  -  - 3.2 1.2 4.4 8.8 2.5
... OPTIMISTIC  -  -  - 4.7 1.6 6.1 12.4 3.5
... NON-LOCAL  -  -  - 1.0 0.6 1.9 3.5 1.0
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